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Introduction	  
My	  rather	  cumbersome	  title	  embodies	  some	  presuppositions	  I	  bring	  to	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  
behaviour,	  though	  perhaps	  not	  very	  controversial	  presuppositions.	  	  First,	  I	  believe	  we	  should	  think	  of	  
the	  biological	  world	  as	  most	  fundamentally	  and	  generally	  composed	  of	  processes	  rather	  than	  of	  
individuals	  or	  organisms.	  	  I	  shall	  say	  a	  little	  about	  this	  below.	  	  Second,	  I	  take	  the	  central	  
explanandum	  of	  evolutionary	  theory	  to	  be	  the	  recurrence	  of	  such	  processes.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  what	  
evolve	  are	  not	  just	  adult	  organisms,	  still	  less	  genomes	  but,	  rather	  the	  full	  development	  cycles	  that	  
connect	  sequences	  of	  such	  things.	  	  These	  developmental	  cycles	  are	  processes	  of	  which	  adult	  
organisms	  are	  time	  slices,	  and	  genomes	  are	  parts	  of	  time	  slices.	  	  The	  topic	  of	  this	  paper,	  then,	  is	  the	  
way	  behaviour	  is	  integrated	  into,	  and	  contributes	  to	  the	  reproduction	  of,	  developmental	  processes.	  	  
An	  enormous	  topic,	  of	  course;	  I	  shall	  offer	  no	  more	  than	  some	  general	  ideas	  on	  ways	  of	  thinking	  
about	  it.	  The	  paper	  will	  mainly	  focus	  on	  the	  specific	  application	  of	  these	  ideas	  to	  the	  understanding	  
of	  human	  behaviour.	  
The	  paper	  will	  begin	  by	  providing	  some	  more	  detailed	  discussion,	  first,	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  importance	  
of	  processes,	  and	  then	  of	  the	  developmental	  systems	  perspective	  on	  evolution.	  	  This	  will	  provide	  the	  
background	  for	  a	  consideration	  of	  special	  issues	  that	  arise	  in	  considering	  the	  evolution	  of	  behaviour.	  	  
A	  particularly	  important	  aspect	  of	  this	  question	  is	  the	  potential	  rate	  of	  behavioural	  evolution.	  	  In	  
opposition	  to	  popular	  arguments	  in	  Evolutionary	  Psychology,	  which	  place	  the	  core	  of	  human	  
behavioural	  evolution	  in	  the	  Pleistocene,	  I	  shall	  argue	  that	  behavioural	  evolution	  is	  likely	  to	  proceed	  
at	  a	  rate	  that	  provides	  much	  greater	  importance	  to	  more	  recent	  human	  history.	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  
significant	  insights	  that	  derive	  from	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  processual	  character	  of	  evolution	  is	  the	  attention	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it	  draws	  on	  the	  very	  different	  rates	  of	  processes	  that	  may	  nevertheless	  coincide	  in	  the	  same	  entity1.	  I	  
will	  conclude	  with	  some	  brief	  remarks	  about	  the	  endlessly	  puzzling	  concept	  of	  human	  nature.	  
Processes	  
I	  shall	  introduce	  this	  discussion	  of	  process	  with	  something	  of	  a	  philosophical	  platitude,	  though	  
perhaps	  one	  the	  significance	  of	  which	  is	  not	  always	  properly	  appreciated.	  	  The	  aim	  of	  science	  is	  not	  
to	  find	  the	  complete	  truth	  about	  everything,	  which	  is	  just	  as	  well	  as	  this	  is	  a	  goal	  of	  dubious	  
intelligibility,	  and	  one	  that	  would	  surely	  be	  impossible	  to	  reach.	  	  Scientific	  descriptions	  are,	  rather,	  
grounded	  in	  abstractions	  from	  the	  massive	  complexity	  of	  nature,	  and	  scientific	  progress	  is	  possible	  
when	  these	  abstractions	  are	  sufficiently	  well-­‐chosen	  to	  allow	  the	  scientist	  to	  address	  particular	  kinds	  
of	  questions2.	  There	  is	  certainly	  no	  unique	  scientific	  truth	  about	  something	  as	  complicated	  as	  an	  
organism,	  a	  paradigmatic	  instance	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  entity	  that	  is	  open	  to	  multiple	  possible	  descriptions;	  
mistaking	  the	  abstractions	  embodied	  in	  a	  particular	  description	  for	  a	  full	  description	  of	  the	  whole	  is	  a	  
potent	  source	  of	  misunderstanding.	  	  	  
Biological	  systems	  are	  hierarchies	  of	  processes.	  	  From	  the	  quantum	  mechanical	  noise	  that	  drives	  
many	  cellular	  processes,	  to	  metabolism,	  development,	  and	  ultimately	  evolution,	  everything	  in	  life	  is	  
in	  flux.	  	  I	  won’t	  attempt	  here	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  notoriously	  problematic	  philosophical	  analysis	  of	  
process3.	  	  The	  simple	  intuitive	  idea	  is	  that	  a	  process	  is	  an	  entity	  that	  could	  not	  be	  an	  entity	  of	  that	  
kind	  without	  underlying	  processes	  of	  change.	  	  A	  rock,	  we	  suppose,	  could	  remain	  precisely	  as	  it	  is	  for	  
any	  length	  of	  time,	  without	  ceasing	  to	  be	  a	  rock.	  	  To	  remain	  a	  mouse,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  host	  of	  
changes	  must	  be	  occurring	  to	  the	  system	  at	  multiple	  levels.	  	  A	  more	  sophisticated	  account	  would	  
allude	  to	  the	  different	  time	  scales	  at	  which	  an	  object	  is	  stable	  or	  change-­‐dependent—a	  mountain,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  For	  elaboration	  of	  this	  point,	  see	  Bapteste	  and	  Dupré	  (2012).	  
2	  A	  less	  platitudinous	  and	  much	  more	  detailed	  elaboration	  of	  these	  claims	  is	  provided	  in	  Dupré	  (1993).	  
3	  The	  locus	  classicus	  is	  Whitehead	  (1929).	  	  The	  notorious	  difficulty	  of	  that	  work	  is	  one	  reason	  why	  the	  general	  
topic	  has	  often	  seemed	  inaccessible.	  	  Much	  more	  approachable	  treatments	  have	  been	  offered	  by	  Rescher	  
(1996,	  2006)	  and	  Seibt	  (2012).	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for	  instance,	  is	  highly	  stable	  at	  a	  mundane	  human	  time	  scale,	  but	  a	  process	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  
tectonics—but	  this	  sophistication	  can	  safely	  be	  ignored	  for	  present	  purposes4.	  	  	  
There	  is	  a	  fundamental	  metaphysical	  debate	  about	  the	  primacy	  of	  things	  vs.	  processes	  that	  can	  be	  
traced	  back	  to	  the	  Greeks—Heraclitus	  is	  generally	  seen	  as	  the	  first	  process	  ontologist	  ("No	  man	  ever	  
steps	  in	  the	  same	  river	  twice"5),	  whereas	  the	  atomism	  of	  Democritus	  and	  others	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  
classic	  statement	  of	  a	  thing-­‐centred	  ontology:	  processes	  are	  changes	  that	  happen	  to	  things.	  Since	  
the	  revival	  of	  atomism	  in	  the	  thought	  of	  such	  seventeenth	  century	  thinkers	  as	  Locke	  and	  Boyle,	  
thing-­‐centred	  ontologies	  have	  dominated	  Western	  philosophy.	  	  	  In	  contrast,	  “as	  process	  ontologists	  
see	  it,	  enduring	  things	  are	  never	  more	  than	  patterns	  of	  stability	  in	  a	  sea	  of	  process”	  (Rescher,	  2006,	  
p.	  14),	  and	  “for	  process	  philosophy,	  what	  a	  thing	  is	  consists	  in	  what	  it	  does”	  (Rescher	  2006,	  p.	  5).	  	  
That	  is	  to	  say	  all	  processes	  are	  things	  but	  not	  vice	  versa.	  	  I	  shall	  not	  attempt	  here	  to	  adjudicate	  this	  
ancient	  debate,	  though	  it	  will	  be	  clear	  that	  I	  have	  considerable	  sympathy	  with	  the	  radically	  
processual	  perspective	  articulated	  by	  Rescher	  and	  others.	  
Despite	  the	  indisputably	  dynamic	  and	  processual	  nature	  of	  biological	  systems,	  biological	  ontologies	  
are	  frequently	  formulated	  in	  terms	  of	  objects	  with	  stable	  properties.	  	  Taxonomies	  for	  instance	  are	  
often	  presented	  as	  a	  set	  of	  adult	  phenotypes	  with	  fixed	  and	  determinate	  properties;	  genomes	  are	  
represented	  as	  sequences	  of	  nucleotides;	  even	  something	  as	  plainly	  dynamic	  as	  a	  metabolic	  network	  
is	  represented	  as	  a	  set	  of	  boxes	  connected	  by	  arrows.	  	  These	  representations	  are	  perfectly	  legitimate	  
abstractions	  from	  the	  underlying	  processes	  and	  they	  may	  serve	  important	  scientific	  purposes.	  	  They	  
also	  have	  potential	  to	  mislead.	  	  Perhaps	  no	  one	  will	  be	  misled	  by	  the	  visual	  presentation	  of	  a	  
metabolic	  network	  into	  thinking	  that	  the	  cell	  contains	  a	  fixed	  and	  stable	  inventory	  of	  chemicals;	  
indeed	  this	  is	  very	  much	  intended	  as	  a	  representation	  of	  process.	  	  But	  it	  is	  much	  easier	  to	  forget	  the	  
highly	  dynamic	  aspects	  of	  the	  genome.	  	  Not	  only	  is	  its	  sequence	  maintained	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  editing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  And	  similarly,	  no	  doubt	  a	  rock	  or	  a	  mountain	  depends	  for	  its	  coherence	  on	  atomic	  processes	  at	  extremely	  
short	  time	  scales.	  
5	  As	  famously	  quoted	  by	  Plato,	  Cratylus,	  402a.	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processes,	  but	  it	  is	  constantly	  changing	  its	  configuration	  in	  response	  to	  epigenetic	  signals	  that	  
determine,	  in	  turn,	  the	  levels	  of	  activity	  at	  different	  loci	  within	  it.	  	  The	  static	  abstraction	  here	  can	  
readily	  encourage	  the	  unidirectional	  model,	  made	  famous	  in	  the	  Central	  Dogma,	  which	  sees	  a	  static	  
and	  unchanging	  genome	  determining	  biological	  form	  from	  generation	  to	  generation.	  
The	  processual	  character	  of	  living	  systems	  is	  essential	  to	  a	  proper	  formulation	  of	  the	  ontology	  of	  
animal	  behaviour.	  	  Organisms	  move	  about	  the	  world	  doing	  many	  different	  things.	  Saying	  what	  an	  
organism	  is	  doing	  is	  more	  or	  less	  of	  an	  abstraction	  from	  the	  dynamic	  stream	  of	  interaction	  between	  
organism	  and	  environment.	  This	  point	  should	  bring	  into	  focus	  a	  familiar	  point	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  
action,	  that	  the	  characterisation	  of	  movements	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  actions	  they	  constitute	  is	  often	  not	  
fully	  determinate	  (Wilson,	  2012).	  	  While	  cooking	  the	  dinner	  I	  move	  my	  hand	  up	  and	  down.	  	  I	  am	  also,	  
by	  virtue	  of	  that	  hand	  movement,	  chopping	  an	  onion	  and,	  in	  this	  case	  unintentionally,	  distributing	  
bacteria	  over	  the	  chopped	  onion.	  	  From	  an	  ecological	  perspective	  that	  connects	  my	  behaviour	  to	  the	  
behaviour	  of	  many	  other	  organisms,	  I	  am	  feeding	  my	  family.	  	  At	  the	  most	  theoretical	  level	  I	  am,	  
perhaps,	  increasing	  my	  fitness.	  	  The	  point	  of	  course,	  is	  that	  different	  interests	  and	  different	  
perspectives	  determine	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  true	  but	  partial	  characterisations	  of	  what	  I	  am	  doing.	  	  The	  
selection	  of	  a	  description	  of	  a	  biological	  system	  is	  never	  wholly	  straightforward;	  in	  the	  case	  of	  animal	  
behaviour	  it	  is	  most	  strikingly	  underdetermined.	  	  
Evolution	  and	  Developmental	  Systems	  
Questions	  about	  evolutionary	  history	  include,	  at	  least,	  questions	  about	  the	  sequence	  of	  different	  
kinds	  of	  organisms,	  questions	  about	  the	  ancestral	  relations	  connecting	  extant	  kinds,	  and	  questions	  
about	  the	  causal	  processes	  resulting	  in	  the	  differences	  between	  ancestral	  kinds	  and	  their	  
descendants.	  	  Behaviour	  is	  of	  most	  obvious	  relevance	  to	  the	  last	  question,	  both	  as	  an	  aspect	  of	  
difference—behaviour	  evolves—and	  a	  cause	  of	  changes	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  evolving	  biological	  kind.	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Developmental	  systems	  theory	  (DST)	  provides,	  in	  my	  view,	  the	  best	  framework	  for	  answering	  
questions	  about	  causal	  processes	  in	  evolution	  (Oyama	  1985;	  Oyama	  et	  al	  2001;	  Griffiths	  and	  Gray	  
2004;	  Robert	  2004).	  DST	  emphasises	  the	  contributions	  of	  multiple	  causal	  agents—genes,	  
environment,	  behaviour	  of	  conspecifics,	  epigenetics,	  etc.—in	  the	  developmental	  process,	  and	  the	  
necessity	  of	  understanding	  evolution	  as	  driving	  the	  coordinated	  assembly	  in	  each	  generation	  of	  all	  of	  
these	  developmental	  resources.	  	  It	  therefore	  offers	  a	  broad	  understanding	  of	  evolution	  according	  to	  
which	  any	  somewhat	  stabilised	  change	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  traits	  in	  a	  population	  should	  count	  as	  an	  
evolutionary	  change.	  This	  is,	  of	  course,	  in	  sharp	  contrast	  with	  the	  still	  widely	  accepted	  definition	  of	  
evolution	  as	  (just)	  change	  in	  gene	  frequency.	  	  There	  is	  nothing	  inherently	  wrong	  with	  the	  latter	  
definition.	  	  But	  it	  will	  by	  definition	  exclude	  any	  changes	  over	  time	  in	  the	  character	  of	  populations	  
that	  do	  not	  consist	  in,	  and	  are	  not	  caused	  by,	  changes	  in	  gene	  frequency.	  	  Since	  it	  is	  well	  established	  
that	  behavioural	  changes	  over	  time	  are	  often	  stabilised	  not	  through	  genetic	  causation	  but	  through	  
cultural	  processes	  such	  as	  imitation,	  the	  narrow	  definition	  is	  quite	  ill-­‐suited	  to	  investigation	  of	  the	  
evolution	  of	  behaviour.	  	  
Developmental	  systems	  theory	  takes	  as	  its	  object	  the	  problem	  alluded	  to	  above,	  the	  explanation	  of	  
the	  recurrence	  of	  developmental	  cycles.	  	  In	  doing	  so	  it	  tries	  to	  take	  account	  of	  the	  whole	  range	  of	  
resources	  that	  are	  deployed	  in	  the	  recreation	  of	  the	  developmental	  cycle.	  	  For	  the	  case	  of	  many	  
animals,	  these	  will	  include,	  minimally,	  the	  fertilised	  egg	  (including	  all	  the	  cytoplasmic	  resources	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  constituents	  of	  the	  nucleus),	  the	  complex	  resources	  provided	  by	  the	  uterine	  
environment,	  a	  highly	  variable	  amount	  of	  postnatal	  parental	  care,	  and	  an	  equally	  variable	  
infrastructure	  of	  resources	  (nests,	  warrens,	  dams,	  etc.)	  that	  are	  provided	  by	  older	  conspecifics	  who	  
may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  close	  kin.	  The	  input	  of	  parents	  or	  other	  conspecifics	  will	  also	  be	  crucial	  in	  many	  
species	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  characteristic	  behavioural	  repertoire	  of	  the	  species—foraging	  
strategies,	  mating	  behaviour,	  communication,	  etc.,	  and,	  very	  importantly,	  acquisition	  of	  the	  skills	  
necessary	  to	  transmit	  this	  repertoire	  to	  one’s	  own	  descendants.	  The	  developmental	  system	  also	  
includes	  the	  facilitation	  of	  the	  recruitment	  of	  the	  array	  of	  symbionts,	  typically	  microbial,	  that	  are	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essential	  for	  the	  successful	  completion	  of	  the	  life	  cycle,	  and	  there	  is	  growing	  evidence	  that	  these	  
symbionts	  can	  be	  crucial	  determinants	  of	  behaviour	  (Al-­‐Asmakh	  et	  al.	  2012;	  Cryan	  and	  Dinan	  2012).	  	  
It	  should	  be	  obvious	  that	  the	  resources	  required	  for	  the	  recreation	  of	  human	  life	  cycles,	  including	  
infrastructure	  such	  as	  schools	  and	  their	  associated	  activities,	  constitute	  a	  uniquely	  complex	  
developmental	  niche.	  	  	  
Behaviour	  
We	  evolved,	  we	  behave,	  therefore	  our	  behaviour	  evolved.	  I	  take	  this	  simple	  argument	  to	  be	  basically	  
sound	  (given	  the	  broad	  concept	  of	  evolution),	  but	  it	  does	  need	  a	  little	  refinement.	  	  In	  stating	  the	  
broad	  concept	  of	  evolution	  I	  suggested	  that	  to	  be	  accounted	  as	  evolutionary,	  changes	  in	  a	  
population	  should	  be	  ‘somewhat	  stabilised’.	  	  This	  is	  intentionally	  vague,	  but	  it	  is	  clear	  enough	  that	  
not	  all	  behaviour	  satisfies	  it.	  	  Transient	  responses	  to	  unusual	  events	  or,	  in	  the	  human	  case,	  all	  
manner	  of	  fads	  and	  fashions,	  will	  not	  be	  sufficiently	  stabilised	  to	  count	  as,	  or	  anyhow	  to	  be	  usefully	  
conceptualised	  as,	  evolutionary	  change.	  	  Human	  behaviour	  is	  also	  highly	  polymorphic,	  and	  this	  may	  
result	  in	  different	  variants	  of	  a	  stabilised	  trait	  being	  stabilised	  in	  different	  populations	  or	  subgroups	  
of	  the	  species.	  The	  various	  physiological	  and	  psychological	  capacities	  that	  make	  human	  speech	  
possible	  are	  certainly	  evolved	  and	  stabilised	  aspects	  of	  the	  human	  phenotype;	  so	  is	  the	  behaviour,	  
generally	  described	  as	  speaking	  a	  language.	  	  Speaking	  French	  or	  Swahili,	  or	  talking	  about	  football,	  
are	  local	  applications	  of	  those	  capacities,	  not	  stabilised	  species-­‐wide	  traits,	  though	  of	  course	  
stabilised	  within	  a	  local	  more	  or	  less	  open	  population.	  	  But	  this	  distinction	  is	  not	  a	  reflection	  of	  
something	  inherent	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  behaviours.	  	  If	  all	  languages	  except,	  say,	  Mandarin	  
eventually	  died	  out	  and	  the	  human	  species	  became	  uniformly	  monoglot,	  then	  learning	  Mandarin	  
would	  have	  become	  a	  stabilised	  part	  of	  the	  phenotype,	  and	  the	  processes	  of	  learning	  it	  would	  have	  
become	  part	  of	  the	  general	  human	  developmental	  niche.	  	  And	  there	  are	  even	  imaginable	  if	  
improbable	  circumstances	  under	  which	  playing	  and	  talking	  about	  football	  could	  become	  a	  stabilised	  
part	  of	  the	  human	  behavioural	  repertoire.	  As	  the	  present	  example	  illustrates,	  it	  is	  often	  useful	  to	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keep	  in	  mind	  the	  distinction	  between	  an	  item	  of	  behaviour,	  a	  general	  category	  of	  which	  that	  item	  is	  
an	  instance,	  and	  the	  capacities	  that	  make	  that	  kind	  of	  behaviour	  possible6.	  
The	  central	  questions	  that	  we	  need	  to	  ask	  about	  the	  evolution	  of	  behaviour,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  behaviour	  is	  
sufficiently	  stabilised	  to	  come	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  an	  evolutionary	  study,	  should	  now	  be	  clear	  
enough:	  What	  causes	  particular	  forms	  of	  behaviour	  continuously	  to	  recur	  at	  particular	  points	  in	  the	  
life	  cycles	  of	  particular	  organisms?	  How	  do	  these	  recurrent	  behaviours	  contribute	  to	  the	  
maintenance	  and	  evolution	  of	  the	  series	  of	  cycles	  of	  which	  they	  are	  part?	  	  Answering	  these	  
questions	  for	  the	  human	  case	  is	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  general	  project	  that	  can	  be	  describes	  as	  the	  
characterisation	  of	  the	  human	  developmental	  niche.	  	  
One	  precondition	  of	  productive	  engagement	  with	  these	  questions	  will	  be	  choosing	  the	  right	  way	  of	  
describing	  behaviour,	  not	  simply	  finding	  the	  behaviour;	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  this	  problem,	  in	  turn,	  is	  
selecting	  the	  right	  scope	  of	  the	  description.	  	  To	  follow	  up	  the	  example	  of	  language,	  speaking	  a	  
language	  is	  part	  of	  the	  evolved	  human	  behavioural	  repertoire,	  speaking	  French	  is	  a	  more	  specific	  
instantiation	  of	  the	  relevant	  behaviour.	  	  The	  capacities	  that	  underlie	  speech	  are	  species	  typical	  
evolved	  characteristics,	  their	  application	  to	  speaking	  French	  is	  a	  local	  application	  of	  these	  capacities.	  	  
Note	  that	  there	  is	  room	  here	  for	  overlapping	  classifications.	  	  It	  might	  be	  that,	  say,	  gossiping	  was	  a	  
stabilised	  aspect	  of	  the	  human	  behavioural	  phenotype.	  	  But	  particular	  gossips	  would	  necessarily	  
employ	  a	  particular	  language.	  	  A	  functional	  classification	  of	  linguistic	  behaviour	  (gossiping,	  telling	  
stories,	  planning	  co-­‐ordinated	  ventures,	  etc.)	  will	  certainly	  cross-­‐classify	  a	  taxonomy	  of	  the	  
languages	  in	  which	  these	  activities	  are	  performed.	  	  And	  aspects	  of	  the	  former	  may	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  
stabilised	  features	  of	  the	  human	  phenotype.	  	  Similarly,	  and	  famously,	  it	  is	  debated	  whether	  syntactic	  
aspects	  of	  different	  languages	  might	  be	  stable	  aspects	  of	  the	  human	  phenotype	  though	  plainly	  the	  
individual	  languages	  are	  not.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The	  upshot	  of	  all	  this	  is	  just	  that	  while	  the	  simple	  argument	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  section	  shows	  us	  
that	  there	  are	  important	  facts	  to	  discover	  about	  the	  evolution	  of	  behaviour,	  these	  may	  involve	  
multiple	  different	  classifications	  of	  behaviour	  and	  multiple	  different	  levels	  of	  abstraction.	  	  Those,	  like	  
myself,	  who	  have	  criticised	  major	  programmes	  that	  study	  the	  evolution	  of	  human	  behaviour,	  notably	  
socio-­‐biology	  and	  its	  offspring,	  Evolutionary	  Psychology,	  have	  not	  claimed	  that	  there	  is	  some	  aspect	  
of	  the	  human	  that	  is	  somehow	  mysteriously	  outside	  the	  realm	  of	  evolution.	  	  It	  is	  rather	  that	  these	  
projects	  have	  used	  conceptualisations	  of	  behaviour	  that	  are	  inappropriate	  for	  evolutionary	  study.	  	  
One	  thing	  that	  has	  made	  these	  inappropriate	  conceptions	  especially	  contentious	  has	  been	  their	  
connection	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  flexibility	  of	  human	  behaviour.	  	  By	  describing	  behavioural	  evolution	  
with	  an	  inappropriately	  narrow	  scope,	  in	  terms	  of	  quite	  specific	  behavioural	  patterns,	  Evolutionary	  
Psychology	  identifies	  these	  as	  what	  have	  been	  evolutionarily	  stabilised.	  	  More	  abstract	  
characterisations	  of	  the	  underlying	  capacities	  as	  what	  has	  been	  stabilised	  imply	  that	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  
actual	  behaviour	  may	  be	  possible.	  	  For	  example,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  we	  have	  evolved	  a	  specialised	  and	  
stabilised	  capacity	  to	  detect	  violations	  of	  social	  rules	  (Cosmides	  and	  Tooby	  2005),	  but	  it	  is	  equally	  
possible	  that	  this	  is	  just	  one	  application	  of	  the	  capacity	  to	  analyse	  social	  relations7.	  A	  good	  deal	  is	  at	  
stake	  in	  getting	  the	  right	  descriptions	  of	  evolved	  behaviour.	  
The	  Fixity	  of	  Human	  Behaviour	  
How	  flexible	  is	  human	  behaviour?	  	  This	  question	  needs	  some	  unpacking.	  We	  need,	  to	  begin	  with,	  to	  
be	  careful	  to	  distinguish	  capacities	  to	  behave	  in	  certain	  ways,	  dispositions	  to	  behave,	  and	  actual	  
behaviour.	  	  Stabilisation	  of	  the	  capacities	  that	  underlie	  most	  behaviour	  is	  almost	  certain	  to	  exist,	  
though	  only	  at	  certain	  levels	  of	  abstraction.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  it	  is	  not	  a	  foregone	  conclusion	  that	  
there	  are	  any	  dispositions	  to	  behaviour,	  though	  no	  doubt	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  there	  are	  some	  at	  least	  at	  
fairly	  abstract	  levels	  of	  description	  such	  as	  ‘raising	  children’	  or	  ‘seeking	  resources’.	  And	  finally	  at	  the	  
level	  of	  actual	  behaviour,	  though	  there	  may	  be	  numerous	  behaviours	  that	  are	  highly	  stable	  features	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  For	  many	  other	  examples	  that	  illustrate	  the	  same	  general	  point,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Moore	  (2001).	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of	  the	  human	  phenotype—crying	  in	  infancy,	  smiling,	  laughing,	  etc.—though	  interesting	  in	  many	  
ways,	  these	  do	  not	  seem	  likely	  to	  be	  central	  to	  the	  project	  of	  delineating	  the	  distinctively	  human	  
Returning	  now	  to	  the	  human	  developmental	  process,	  I	  shall	  next	  consider	  how	  capacities	  for	  
behaviour	  might	  figure	  in	  an	  account	  of	  human	  evolution.	  	  A	  first	  crucial	  point	  is	  that	  capacities	  are	  
not	  merely	  intrinsic	  feature	  of	  humans,	  but	  relations	  between	  intrinsic	  properties	  of	  humans	  and	  
features	  of	  the	  environment,	  social	  or	  material.	  The	  capacity	  to	  speak	  a	  language	  depends	  on	  having	  
the	  right	  kind	  of	  brain,	  but	  equally	  on	  living	  within	  a	  linguistic	  community.	  The	  linguistic	  community	  
is	  essential	  for	  acquiring	  a	  language,	  but	  is	  equally	  necessary	  for	  using	  it8.	  It	  is	  not	  easy,	  perhaps	  not	  
possible,	  to	  separate	  the	  internal	  and	  external	  prerequisites.	  	  The	  features	  of	  the	  brain	  that	  are	  
required	  for	  speaking	  do	  not	  just	  develop	  willy-­‐nilly	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  they	  will	  find	  themselves	  in	  a	  
speech-­‐laden	  environment.	  	  Without	  linguistic	  inputs	  they	  do	  not	  develop	  at	  all.	  	  This	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  
the	  necessity	  of	  thinking	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  full	  developmental	  niche:	  the	  parts	  of	  the	  niche	  are	  highly	  
interdependent.	  	  To	  take	  a	  quite	  different	  example,	  consider	  the	  capacity	  to	  move	  around	  multi-­‐
storey	  buildings.	  	  The	  capacity	  to	  climb	  stairs	  is	  entirely	  lacking	  in	  paraplegics.	  	  However	  the	  capacity	  
to	  move	  around	  multi-­‐storey	  buildings	  depends,	  for	  such	  people	  on	  whether	  there	  are	  lifts	  or	  ramps.	  	  
If	  there	  are	  only	  stairs	  they	  lack	  the	  capacity;	  if	  there	  are	  lifts	  they	  have	  it	  as	  much	  as	  anyone	  else9.	  	  
In	  this	  case	  the	  external	  and	  internal	  features	  seem	  more	  separable;	  but	  the	  capacity	  depends	  on	  
the	  proper	  combination	  of	  both.	  
But	  it	  will	  be	  said	  that	  questions	  about	  the	  internal	  amenities	  of	  buildings	  have	  little	  or	  nothing	  to	  do	  
with	  evolution,	  unless	  perhaps	  in	  predicting	  long	  term	  changes	  in	  human	  evolution	  if	  those	  changes	  
remain	  in	  place	  for	  long	  enough—perhaps	  atrophy	  of	  no	  longer	  needed	  limbs.	  The	  common	  
assumption	  that	  they	  are	  not	  part	  of	  evolution	  is	  generally	  grounded	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  they	  are	  too	  
transitory,	  too	  shallowly	  rooted	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  species	  lineage,	  to	  qualify	  as	  evolved.	  	  In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Here	  I	  interpet	  and	  endorse—both	  controversially—Wittgenstein’s	  famous,	  or	  notorious,	  private	  language	  
argument	  (Wittgenstein	  1953).	  	  Nothing	  in	  the	  resent	  paper	  depends	  heavily	  on	  this	  endorsement,	  however.	  
9	  This	  issue	  is	  discussed	  further	  in	  Dupré	  1998.	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anticipation	  of	  this	  complaint	  I	  have	  several	  times	  mentioned	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  stabilisation	  of	  a	  trait	  as	  
a	  condition	  of	  its	  being	  properly	  counted	  as	  evolved.	  	  But	  how	  much	  stabilisation	  is	  necessary?	  	  
Clearly	  less	  than	  total,	  or	  evolution	  would	  be	  replaced	  by	  stasis	  (compare	  Richard	  Dawkins’s	  (1976)	  
genes,	  somewhat	  ironically	  described	  as	  ‘immortal’).	  	  Part	  of	  the	  answer	  must	  be	  that	  without	  being	  
totally	  stabilised,	  for	  a	  trait	  to	  count	  as	  evolved	  it	  must	  have	  features	  that	  potentially	  stabilise	  it,	  that	  
at	  least	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  entrench	  it	  in	  the	  wider	  developmental	  system.	  	  Germ-­‐line	  mutations,	  of	  
course,	  have	  this	  potential	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  familiar	  ability	  to	  be	  transferred	  to	  the	  next	  generation	  
through	  reproduction,	  and	  so	  do	  a	  host	  of	  other	  cytoplasmic	  elements	  that	  can,	  in	  principle,	  be	  
passed	  indefinitely	  from	  mother	  to	  daughter	  in	  cellular	  divisions.	  	  But	  so	  do	  elements	  of	  behaviour	  
that	  could	  be	  taught,	  for	  instance	  by	  parents,	  or	  learned	  by	  imitation.	  So	  what	  distinguishes	  an	  item	  
of	  behaviour,	  or	  for	  that	  matter	  a	  mutation,	  that	  for	  a	  period	  of	  time	  becomes	  prevalent	  in	  a	  
population,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  evolutionary	  history	  of	  that	  population?	  Here	  it	  may	  be	  impossible	  to	  do	  
better	  than	  just	  to	  insist	  that	  the	  element	  of	  behaviour	  have	  some	  minimum	  significance,	  some	  
sufficient	  impact	  on	  the	  overall	  pattern	  of	  behaviour.	  	  	  
That	  the	  preceding	  proposal	  is	  vague	  is	  probably	  to	  its	  credit.	  After	  all	  any	  trait	  that	  appears	  in	  an	  
evolving	  population	  is	  part	  of	  its	  total	  history,	  and	  any	  behavioural	  trait	  has	  a	  possible	  mechanism	  
(intergenerational	  teaching	  or	  imitation)	  for	  becoming	  entrenched.	  	  So	  ultimately	  we	  should	  not	  
expect	  more	  than	  principled	  judgements	  about	  whether	  a	  trait	  that	  appears	  with	  some	  frequency	  at	  
some	  point	  in	  the	  history	  of	  a	  lineage	  is	  a	  part	  of	  its	  evolutionary	  history	  worth	  mentioning.	  	  
Recalling	  the	  point	  with	  which	  this	  essay	  began,	  science	  does	  not	  aim	  to	  provide	  the	  whole	  truth.	  
But	  there	  is	  a	  more	  substantive	  practical	  point	  in	  the	  background	  of	  this	  discussion.	  	  We	  are	  inclined	  
to	  think	  of	  evolved	  features	  of	  humans	  as	  immutable	  and	  therefore	  not	  subject	  to	  normative	  
evaluation,	  whereas	  non-­‐evolved	  ones	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  providing	  the	  proper	  domain	  for	  ethical	  or	  
political	  debate.	  	  Conceptually	  this	  is	  just	  a	  mistake	  (Hull	  1986).	  	  But	  the	  connection	  of	  the	  evolved	  
with	  the	  stabilised	  does	  point	  to	  an	  important	  related	  truth.	  	  If	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  mutability	  of	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behaviour	  we	  should	  certainly	  be	  concerned	  to	  understand	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  behaviour	  is	  
stabilised	  and	  entrenched	  in	  the	  developmental	  niche.	  	  And	  this	  is	  equally	  a	  crucial	  topic	  in	  
understanding	  evolution,	  behavioural	  or	  otherwise.	  
	  An	  especially	  important	  aspect	  of	  these	  stabilisation	  processes	  is	  their	  very	  diverse	  time	  scales,	  and	  
this	  is	  an	  essential	  topic	  for	  understanding	  behavioural	  change.	  	  Evolutionary	  psychologists,	  as	  I	  have	  
mentioned,	  suppose	  that	  the	  slow	  rate	  of	  genetic	  change	  is	  such	  that	  our	  basic	  behavioural	  
capacities	  and	  indeed	  dispositions,	  must	  have	  evolved	  in	  the	  Pleistocene,	  and	  are	  now	  essentially	  
the	  same	  as	  those	  that	  originated	  then.	  	  Our	  behavioural	  tendencies	  are	  deeply	  atavistic:	  we	  are	  
apes	  in	  skyscrapers10.	  	  But	  even	  if	  one	  accepts	  that	  there	  is	  some	  level	  of	  description	  of	  human	  
behavioural	  descriptions	  at	  which	  this	  is	  true,	  an	  ape	  in	  a	  skyscraper	  is	  a	  quite	  different	  animal	  from	  
an	  ape	  in	  a	  tree.	  	  The	  skyscraper	  is	  part	  of	  a	  developmental	  niche	  that	  will	  produce	  an	  animal	  with	  
quite	  different	  capacities	  and,	  for	  that	  matter,	  a	  quite	  different	  brain.	  Many	  animals	  drive	  their	  own	  
evolution	  by	  manipulating	  their	  environments	  including,	  as	  Darwin	  described	  in	  great	  detail	  in	  his	  
final	  book,	  the	  humble	  earthworm	  (Darwin	  1881).	  	  But	  humans	  have	  taken	  this	  to	  a	  quite	  different	  
level	  from	  any	  other	  animal.	  	  Evolving	  wings	  takes	  many	  millions	  of	  years;	  yet	  humans	  have	  evolved	  
the	  capacity	  to	  fly	  in	  a	  few	  decades.	  	  So	  even	  if	  evolutionary	  psychologists	  are	  right	  about	  some	  
underlying	  capacities	  that	  are	  stabilised	  over	  very	  long	  periods,	  actual	  behaviour	  is	  enormously	  
flexible.	  
Is	  a	  behavioural	  capacity	  such	  as	  flight	  an	  insufficiently	  stabilised	  trait	  to	  belong	  to	  the	  evolved	  
human	  phenotype?	  	  And	  if	  so,	  what	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  judgement?	  The	  first	  question	  is,	  in	  the	  
standardly	  derogatory	  sense,	  purely	  semantic.	  	  As	  I	  have	  just	  explained,	  there	  is	  no	  sharp	  distinction	  
among	  traits	  that	  distinguishes	  those	  sufficiently	  stabilised	  to	  belong	  in	  an	  evolutionary	  account	  of	  
the	  species	  history.	  	  But	  what	  is	  important	  is	  that	  we	  recognise	  the	  flexibility	  of	  human	  behaviour	  
that	  gives	  rise	  to	  questions	  of	  this	  kind.	  	  Recognising	  this	  flexibility	  is	  not	  to	  endorse	  the	  ‘blank	  slate’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  For	  a	  detailed	  critique	  of	  the	  assumption	  of	  atavism,	  see	  Dupré	  2009.	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so	  derided	  by	  evolutionary	  psychologists,	  but	  merely	  to	  note	  the	  empirical	  fact	  that	  human	  
behaviour	  changes,	  sometimes	  very	  rapidly.	  And	  of	  course	  the	  capacity	  of	  behaviour	  to	  change	  thus	  
rapidly	  is	  something	  that	  cries	  out	  for	  explanation,	  and	  explanation	  in	  terms	  of	  remarkably	  adapted	  
cognitive	  capacities.	  	  What	  can	  be	  quite	  obviously	  inferred	  from	  the	  empirical	  observation	  of	  
flexibility	  is	  that	  the	  relevant	  adapted	  structures	  are	  not	  adaptations	  for	  very	  specific	  forms	  of	  
behaviour,	  as	  evolutionary	  psychologists	  often	  seem	  to	  suppose.	  Similarly	  the	  wonderful	  versatility	  
of	  the	  human	  hand	  shouldn’t	  lead	  us	  to	  suppose	  that	  it	  lacks	  any	  structure;	  but	  it	  may	  very	  
reasonably	  encourage	  the	  thought	  that	  the	  versatility	  implicit	  in	  its	  structure	  was	  part	  of	  the	  
adaptive	  advantage	  that	  drove	  its	  evolution.	  
Whatever	  one	  may	  think	  of	  the	  human	  capacity	  to	  fly,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  technology	  should	  not	  
be	  stably	  embedded	  in	  the	  human	  developmental	  niche,	  and	  much	  of	  it	  surely	  is.	  	  No	  one	  should	  
seriously	  question	  whether	  agriculture,	  clothing,	  and	  tool	  use	  are	  established	  evolved	  features	  of	  the	  
human	  developmental	  repertoire.	  	  To	  take	  a	  slightly	  more	  contentious	  and	  relatively	  recent	  
achievement,	  think	  of	  the	  capacity	  to	  eat	  a	  variety	  of	  hard	  or	  fibrous	  foods	  that	  require	  chewing.	  	  
Not	  long	  ago	  this	  was	  the	  prerogative	  of	  the	  young,	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  developmental	  cycle	  that	  was	  
lost	  as	  inevitably	  the	  teeth	  rotted	  and	  fell	  away	  in	  mid-­‐life.	  	  Now,	  where	  there	  is	  access	  to	  good	  
dentistry,	  this	  capacity	  extends	  throughout	  the	  life	  cycle.	  	  It	  is,	  of	  course,	  possible	  to	  exclude	  
technology	  by	  fiat	  from	  figuring	  in	  an	  account	  of	  human	  evolution,	  most	  obviously	  by	  insisting	  on	  
defining	  evolution	  in	  terms	  of	  changes	  in	  gene	  frequency.	  	  But	  the	  price	  of	  this	  move	  is	  to	  make	  
evolutionary	  theory	  largely	  irrelevant	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  human	  phenotype	  or,	  worse,	  to	  motivate	  a	  
bizarre	  thesis	  of	  systematic	  human	  maladaptation11.	  
Most	  technologically	  mediated	  changes	  in	  human	  capacity	  have	  little	  obvious	  impact	  on	  physiology,	  
yet	  they	  may	  result	  in	  well	  stabilised	  changes	  in	  behavioural	  dispositions.	  Examples	  are	  legion.	  The	  
advent	  of	  televisions	  brought	  it	  about	  in	  many	  human	  populations	  that	  the	  typical	  daily	  behavioural	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




pattern	  involved	  several	  hours	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day	  sitting	  silently	  staring	  at	  a	  rectangular	  screen;	  
the	  growth	  of	  personal	  computers	  has	  extended	  a	  broadly	  similar	  behaviour	  into	  large	  chunks	  of	  
many	  peoples’	  diurnal	  routine,	  sometimes	  punctuated	  by	  rhythmic	  tapping	  of	  the	  area	  immediately	  
in	  front	  of	  the	  screen.	  	  And	  in	  fact	  these	  behavioural	  changes	  do	  have	  a	  quite	  systematic	  affect	  on	  
developed	  human	  physiology.	  	  Humans	  who	  spend	  much	  of	  their	  life	  in	  front	  of	  these	  screens	  tend	  
to	  become	  obese,	  incapable	  of	  strenuous	  activity,	  and	  sometimes	  dependent	  on	  sophisticated	  
medical	  technologies	  to	  mitigate	  the	  adverse	  fitness	  consequences	  of	  these	  changes.	  	  No	  doubt	  
there	  are	  more	  subtle	  though	  equally	  important	  changes	  to	  their	  brains.	  	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  
whether	  these	  behavioural	  changes	  (or	  the	  related	  physiological	  changes)	  will	  prove	  to	  characterise	  
a	  few	  human	  populations	  for	  a	  matter	  of	  decades,	  or	  whether	  they	  will	  become	  increasingly	  stably	  
entrenched	  in	  species	  typical	  behavioural	  patterns.	  	  The	  point	  is	  only	  that	  the	  latter	  is	  entirely	  
possible,	  and	  in	  that	  case	  they	  would	  become	  as	  much	  a	  part	  of	  our	  evolutionary	  history	  as	  parallel	  
non-­‐human	  examples	  such	  as	  the	  maintenance	  and	  occupation	  of	  beaver	  dams	  and	  termite	  mounds,	  
or	  in	  the	  human	  case	  such	  fully	  entrenched	  aspects	  of	  behaviour	  as	  wearing	  clothes	  and	  growing	  
crops.	  	  	  	  	  
There	  is,	  anyhow,	  a	  deeper	  biological	  reason	  for	  insisting	  on	  the	  inseparability	  of	  nature	  and	  
environment,	  and	  one	  that	  extends	  far	  beyond	  the	  special	  human	  case.	  	  It	  is	  also	  a	  biological	  
development	  that	  makes	  the	  traditional	  understanding	  of	  evolution	  as	  ultimately	  about	  gene	  
frequencies	  completely	  and	  finally	  untenable.	  This	  development	  is	  the	  growing	  appreciation	  of	  the	  
importance	  of	  epigenetics.	  	  Epigenetics	  can	  most	  generally	  be	  understood	  as	  referring	  to	  whatever	  
explains	  why	  cells	  with	  the	  same	  genomes	  express	  different	  genes	  and	  perform	  different	  functions.	  	  
It	  is	  now	  understood	  that	  much	  of	  this	  is	  determined	  by	  chemical	  and	  physical	  modifications	  of	  the	  
structure	  of	  the	  chromosomes,	  for	  example	  through	  methylation	  and	  histone	  modification.	  	  The	  
important	  point	  here	  is	  not	  the	  details	  of	  these	  processes,	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  environmental	  stimuli	  
are	  now	  known	  to	  trigger	  epigenetic	  changes	  to	  the	  genome.	  	  Thus	  any	  idea	  of	  some	  set	  of	  
genetically	  grounded	  dispositions	  entirely	  free	  of	  environmental	  influences	  must	  be	  rejected.	  	  The	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genome	  is	  a	  fully	  interactive	  part	  of	  the	  whole	  system	  of	  causes	  that	  produce	  organismal	  
development,	  even	  the	  development	  of	  capacities	  and	  dispositions	  to	  behave12.	  
The	  most	  famous	  example	  of	  behavioural	  epigenetics	  is	  found	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Michael	  Meaney	  and	  
his	  associates	  on	  rodents.	  	  Specifically,	  Meaney	  found	  that	  grooming	  of	  rat	  pups	  by	  mother	  rats	  led	  
to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  pups	  into	  less	  fearful	  and	  cautious	  adult	  rats.	  	  It	  was	  claimed	  that	  this	  was	  
mediated	  by	  the	  demethylation	  of	  a	  gene	  for	  the	  receptor	  of	  glucocorticoid	  in	  the	  brain,	  increasing	  
the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  developing	  rat’s	  brain	  to	  this	  transmitter.	  There	  is	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  controversy	  
surrounding	  this	  research	  and	  its	  interpretation.	  	  Critics	  point	  out	  that	  there	  is	  no	  established	  
mechanism	  connecting	  maternal	  care	  to	  the	  alleged	  demethylation	  events,	  and	  that	  the	  results	  are	  
quantitatively	  fairly	  small.	  	  Particular	  controversial	  is	  the	  question	  to	  what	  extent	  epigenetic	  
changes,	  specifically	  methylation	  patterns,	  can	  be	  transgenerationally	  transmitted,	  though	  there	  
seems	  to	  be	  a	  growing	  consensus	  that	  this	  happens	  more	  than	  had	  until	  recently	  been	  thought	  
(Jablonka	  and	  Raz	  2009).	  	  A	  nice	  point	  about	  the	  Meaney	  example,	  however,	  is	  that	  it	  illustrates	  that	  
transmission	  at	  the	  molecular	  level	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  evolutionary	  change.	  	  Transgenerational	  
transmission	  is,	  of	  course,	  important	  in	  arguing	  that	  a	  change	  is	  sufficiently	  stabilised	  in	  a	  population	  
to	  count	  as	  evolutionary.	  	  But	  this	  stabilisation	  doesn’t	  have	  to	  involve	  transmission	  through	  the	  
gametes.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  rats,	  the	  behavioural	  changes	  in	  the	  well-­‐groomed	  rats	  are	  such	  as	  to	  
make	  it	  likely	  that	  they	  will,	  if	  female,	  provide	  similar	  care	  to	  their	  own	  offspring.	  	  Thus	  methylation	  
of	  cells	  in	  the	  brain	  is	  a	  link	  in	  the	  process	  that	  connects	  the	  behavioural	  phenotype	  of	  one	  
generation	  to	  the	  next,	  but	  a	  link	  entirely	  bypassing	  the	  germ	  line.	  
Even	  if	  many	  of	  the	  postulated	  mechanisms	  connecting	  environment	  and	  behaviour	  through	  
epigenetic	  mechanisms	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  wrong,	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  something	  of	  this	  kind	  
must	  be	  happening	  is	  increasingly	  overwhelming.	  Particularly	  impressive	  are	  correlations	  between	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  For	  a	  detailed	  treatment	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  epigenetics	  to	  evolution,	  see	  Jablonka	  and	  Lamb	  2005.	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parental	  environments	  and	  physiological	  traits	  of	  descendants	  at	  some	  generation’s	  remove13.	  	  
Although	  the	  mechanisms	  are	  poorly	  understood	  in	  this	  case,	  it	  seems	  irrefutable	  that	  they	  must	  
involve	  some	  heritable	  change	  to	  a	  physical	  feature	  of	  the	  organism,	  since	  the	  missing	  generation	  
removes	  the	  possibility	  of	  behavioural	  transmission.	  	  	  
The	  fact	  that	  germline	  cells	  are	  not	  the	  only	  connection	  between	  generations	  is	  a	  fundamental	  point	  
about	  the	  DST	  perspective.	  	  Behaviours	  can	  be	  learned;	  physiological	  development	  can	  be	  affected	  
by	  all	  manner	  of	  inputs	  from	  the	  environment,	  whether	  or	  not	  directly	  provided	  by	  parents	  or	  other	  
conspecifics.	  What	  epigenetics	  adds	  to	  this	  expansion	  of	  modes	  of	  transmission	  is	  a	  potential	  link	  
between	  environmental	  inputs	  and	  biological	  inputs	  at	  the	  deepest	  genetic	  level.	  	  The	  conceptual	  
significance	  of	  the	  absorption	  of	  epigenetics	  into	  the	  main	  streams	  of	  both	  molecular	  and	  
evolutionary	  biology	  is	  that	  the	  separation	  of	  genes	  form	  environment,	  or	  nature	  form	  nurture,	  is	  no	  
longer	  tenable	  at	  any	  level.	  	  There	  is,	  therefore,	  no	  privileged	  role	  for	  genes	  in	  evolution,	  as	  DST	  
advocates	  have	  long	  insisted,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  coherent	  argument	  for	  attaching	  a	  unique	  importance	  
to	  the	  capacities	  underlying	  behaviour	  that	  evolved	  a	  million	  or	  two	  years	  ago	  in	  the	  Pleistocene.	  
Human	  Nature	  
Where	  does	  all	  this	  leave	  the	  concept	  of	  human	  nature?	  	  I	  think	  there	  is	  much	  to	  be	  said	  for	  trying	  to	  
get	  rid	  of	  the	  concept	  altogether,	  since	  it	  is	  almost	  inevitably	  going	  to	  be	  misinterpreted	  as	  
something	  static	  and	  largely	  immutable.	  	  But	  as	  a	  second	  best	  alternative,	  we	  can	  make	  an	  effort	  to	  
be	  as	  clear	  as	  possible	  about	  what	  sorts	  of	  general	  statements	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  humans	  can	  be	  
supported.	  	  	  
The	  first	  point,	  perhaps	  very	  obvious,	  but	  certainly	  insufficiently	  recognised,	  is	  that	  human	  nature	  
must	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  cycle	  not	  the	  description	  of	  any	  stage	  in	  that	  cycle.	  	  Of	  course,	  a	  typical	  description	  
of	  the	  organism	  at	  early	  maturity,	  say,	  could	  be	  a	  part	  of	  the	  description	  of	  the	  cycle.	  	  But	  even	  aart	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  See	  especially	  the	  work	  of	  Marcus	  Pembrey	  and	  associates	  with	  the	  ALSPAC	  longitudinal	  study.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  
Pembrey	  et	  al.	  2006.	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from	  the	  danger	  of	  taking	  this	  part	  for	  the	  whole,	  emphasis	  on	  the	  cycle	  makes	  it	  much	  easier	  to	  see	  
that	  a	  particular	  state	  at	  a	  particular	  stage	  in	  the	  cycle	  may	  be	  liable	  to	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  variability	  both	  
between	  individuals	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  over	  time.	  	  And	  this,	  in	  turn,	  reflects	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  
inextricably	  intertwined	  factors	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  production	  of	  the	  cycle,	  many	  of	  these	  may	  
undergo	  changes	  that	  can	  be	  stabilised	  within	  the	  cycle,	  and	  therefore,	  finally,	  many	  evolutionary	  
processes	  are	  possible	  at	  a	  variety	  of	  time	  scales.	  
It	  is,	  however,	  a	  gross	  error	  to	  confuse	  this	  individual	  diversity	  and	  evolutionary	  malleability	  with	  the	  
total	  amorphousness	  of	  the	  blank	  slate.	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  there	  are	  extremely	  complex	  and	  
impressive	  states	  of	  the	  human,	  especially	  the	  human	  brain,	  that	  make	  possible	  this	  malleability.	  	  To	  
repeat	  an	  earlier	  analogy,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  human	  hand	  is	  capable	  of	  manipulating	  multiple	  entities	  
in	  the	  environment	  in	  many	  different	  ways	  depends	  precisely	  on	  its	  having	  a	  very	  reliably	  
reproduced	  structure	  that	  facilitates	  these	  diverse	  manipulations.	  	  The	  problem	  with	  enterprises	  
such	  as	  socio-­‐biology	  and	  evolutionary	  psychology	  is	  that	  they	  have	  looked	  for	  stable	  features	  of	  the	  
human	  life	  cycle	  at	  the	  wrong	  level	  of	  abstraction.	  Diversity	  of	  human	  behaviour	  is	  not	  something	  to	  
be	  explained	  away	  as	  a	  noisy	  overlay	  on	  a	  standard	  underlying	  behavioural	  disposition,	  but	  should	  be	  
sees	  as	  revealing	  a	  reliably	  reproduced	  capacity	  to	  acquire	  behavioural	  dispositions	  suited	  to	  the	  
cultural	  and	  other	  exigencies	  of	  a	  specific	  human	  developmental	  niche.	  	  	  
The	  problem	  is	  that	  this	  correct	  level	  of	  abstraction	  offers	  something	  that	  may	  seem	  quite	  unsuited	  
to	  answering	  traditional	  questions	  about	  human	  nature.	  	  Certainly	  for	  many	  areas	  of	  science,	  for	  
example	  neurobiology	  and	  much	  of	  psychology,	  explaining	  the	  diversity	  and	  versatility	  of	  human	  
behaviour	  is	  naturally	  seen	  as	  a	  central	  part	  of	  their	  agenda.	  	  And	  to	  many	  interested	  in	  human	  
evolution,	  the	  rapidity	  of	  human	  behavioural	  change	  may	  seem	  a	  central	  explanandum.	  	  But	  more	  
everyday	  uses	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  human	  nature,	  uses	  that	  identify	  specific	  kinds	  of	  behaviour	  as	  in	  
accordance	  or	  discordance	  with	  human	  nature,	  often	  even	  carrying	  a	  strong	  normative	  implication,	  
will	  be	  difficult	  to	  get	  rid	  of.	  	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  I	  think	  there	  is	  much	  to	  be	  said	  for	  trying	  to	  get	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rid	  of	  the	  expression	  altogether.	  	  If,	  nonetheless,	  it	  were	  possible	  to	  convey	  the	  idea	  to	  a	  wide	  
audience,	  that	  diversity,	  flexibility	  and	  adaptability	  were	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  human,	  and	  indeed	  what	  
constituted	  the	  very	  special	  and	  remarkable	  achievement	  of	  human	  evolution,	  this	  might	  be	  the	  best	  
possible	  outcome14.	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